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Resurgent Malaria at the Millennium
Control Strategies in Crisis
J. Kevin Baird
Parasitic Diseases Program, US Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2, Jakarta, Indonesia
Abstract Completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 marked the beginning of an era of
vector control that achieved conspicuous success against malaria. In 1955 the
World Health Organization (WHO) adopted the controversial Global Eradication
Campaign emphasising DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) spraying in
homes. The incidence of malaria fell sharply where the programme was imple-
mented, but the strategy was not applied in holoendemic Africa. This, along with
the failure to achieve eradication in larger tropical regions, contributed to disil-
lusionment with the policy. The World Health Assembly abandoned the eradica-
tion strategy in 1969. A resurgence of malaria began at about that time and today
reaches into areas where eradication or control had been achieved. A global ma-
laria crisis looms. In 1993 the WHO adopted a Global Malaria Control Strategy
that placed priority in control of disease rather than infection. This formalises a
policy that emphasises diagnosis and treatment in a primary healthcare setting,
while de-emphasising spraying of residual insecticides. The new policy explicitly
stresses malaria in Africa, but expresses the intent to bring control programmes
around the world into line with the strategy.
This review raises the argument that a global control strategy conceived to
address the extraordinary malaria situation in Africa may not be suitable else-
where. The basis of argument lies in the accomplishments of the Global Eradica-
tion Campaign viewed in an historical and geographical context. Resurgent malaria
accompanying declining vector control activities in Asia and the Americas sug-
gests that the abandonment of residual spraying may be premature given the tools
now at hand. The inadequacy of vector control as the primary instrument of
malaria control in holoendemic Africa does not preclude its utility in Asia and
the Americas.
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In 1955 the eradication of malaria seemed with-
in reach.[1] Less than 50 years later malaria is re-
surgent, causing an increasing number of infections
across an expanded geographic range (fig. 1).[2,3]
Spreading resistance to available antimalarials has
rendered effective treatment increasingly difficult
for most people exposed to infection. In some
areas, the possibility of untreatable multidrug-
resistant malaria looms and economic realities in
many areas leave malaria essentially incurable
with the affordable antimalarials at hand. Parasite
survival in the face of chemotherapeutic interven-
tion is more likely than ever. In many areas, the
ability to perform a microscopic diagnosis of ma-
laria has been lost with the retirement of a genera-
tion of health workers trained during the heyday of
the Global Eradication Campaign. Likewise, the
deterioration of vector control programmes and
mounting social pressure against using pesticides
like DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) fa-
vour vector survival and disease transmission. Fi-
nally, three urgently needed weapons against malaria
have yet to materialise: a vaccine for prevention;
an affordable, well tolerated and effective alterna-
tive to chloroquine for the treatment of uncompli-
cated malaria; and a practical alternative to DDT
for vector control. The rule in endemic areas is high
risk of infection, inadequate diagnosis, ineffective
treatment and a derelict prevention infrastructure.
Not since before World War II have tropical public
health officers faced so serious a menace with such
inadequate tools to fight it. The situation holds the
potential for an explosive increase in the risk of
malaria and there is general disagreement sur-
rounding strategies to avert such a disaster.
Malaria control activities in the developing world
have historically been guided by strategies put
forth by the World Health Organization (WHO).
The World Health Assembly has delivered land-
mark policies in malaria control in 1955, 1969 and,
most recently, 1993. The last contribution, ‘World
Declaration on the Control of Malaria and Global
Malaria Control Strategy’,[4] represents a radical
departure from past policies. The strategy embraces
the philosophy of controlling disease rather than
infection per se. Apart from insecticide-treated
bed nets, vector control measures have been de-
emphasised. The declaration does not advocate
complete abandonment of vector control, but en-
dorses its application under stringent criteria that
virtually preclude use in developing nations. The
new policy focuses attention and resources upon
diagnosis and treatment of infected individuals in
a primary healthcare setting, rather than preventing
infection in communities. This strategy represents
a sensible approach to attacking malaria in holo-
endemic Africa, where about 90% of the 300 to 500
million new cases of malaria and 1.5 to 2.7 million
Malaria regions
Fig. 1. Geographic range of malaria in 1994.
720 Baird
© Adis International Limited. All rights reserved. Drugs 2000 Apr; 59 (4)
deaths occur each year.[5] However, the suitability
of this explicitly African strategy for the rest of the
world has not been established. This is a critical issue
because the resurgence of malaria most threatens
endemic regions outside Africa.
The debate over clinical- versus vector-based ap-
proaches to malaria control began soon after Ron-
ald Ross identified anopheline mosquitoes as vec-
tors in 1897. Ross’s vigorous advocacy of malaria
control through attack on the mosquito sparked
controversy.[6] Completion of the Panama Canal in
1914, made possible by controlling the vectors of
malaria and yellow fever, vindicated Ross. Vector
control came to dominate malaria control strategies,
infrastructure and practice for the next 50 years.
The most recent WHO policy represents a formal
departure from that approach, essentially institut-
ing the clinical approach to the control of malaria.
However, no compelling body of work demonstrates
the utility of clinical management as the primary
instrument of a broadly applied malaria control pro-
gramme. The public health advantage gained through
a focus on clinical management in lieu of vector
control remains hypothetical. What explains the
broad advocacy of this approach? The history of
malaria and its control in the 20th century offers
insights.
This review examines the retreat and resurgence
of malaria in the 20th century. What has been done
to control malaria? What is being done? What
should be done? Discordant answers to the last
question in the community of malaria workers re-
veal disagreement on strategies intended to bring
malaria under control. Clinical- versus vector-
based control strategies form broad lines of divi-
sion at the foundation of strategic thinking. This
review explores the basis of that division by exam-
ining the global resurgence of malaria in an histor-
ical and geographical context. The WHO’s 1993
Global Malaria Control Strategy emerged from the
perceived failure of its predecessor, the 1955 pol-
icy that aimed for eradication. The earlier policy
was neither applied to nor relevant to holoendemic
malaria in sub-Saharan Africa. The new policy
maps out strategies that carry a distinctly African
point of view with respect to malaria as a public
health issue. Therein lies the basis of discord: a
control strategy conceived in an African context
may not be globally applicable. Control of disease
rather than infection is sensible in holoendemic
sub-Saharan Africa, where, by virtue of naturally
acquired immunity, each infection carries a rela-
tively low risk of disease or death. Resources may
be focused on the minority at risk (infants, small
children and pregnant women). In Asia and the
Americas, however, each infection carries a rela-
tively high risk of disease or death. Thus, late in-
tervention in the clinical setting carries avoidable
risks, especially against a backdrop of the currently
poor instruments of diagnosis and treatment. Con-
trol of risk of infection by attacking the vector is a
sensible and, as the retreat of malaria earlier in the
century demonstrated, practical approach.
1. Malaria in Retreat: 1904 to 1969
1.1 Malaria Revealed
An obscure French Army surgeon, Alphonse
Laveran, ascertained the protozoan cause of ma-
laria in 1880.[7] Leading malariologists of the day
initially dismissed Laveran’s finding, instead cling-
ing to the fashionable concept of a bacterial cause
of malaria. Clinicians and scientists with access to
malaria patients and having ability with the micro-
scope gradually affirmed Laveran. He received the
Nobel Prize in 1907. In 1897 Ronald Ross, then a
British Indian Army medical officer, described the
infection of anopheline mosquitoes fed on para-
sitaemic birds.[8] The prominent Italian malariolo-
gists led by Grassi confirmed the findings of Ross
in humans in 1899.[9] Ross received the Nobel
Prize in 1902. At the beginning of the 20th century
the specific cause of malaria and its route of trans-
mission was known with certainty.
Ross advocated mosquito sanitation as the pri-
marymeans of controllingmalaria. During the 1900s
his theories were tested in Senegal, Ghana and
Burma,[6] with either limited success or none at all.
Ross persisted in his advocacy of attacking the vec-
tor and sparked acrimonious criticism from those
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advocating an approach focused on clinical treat-
ment with quinine as a means of malaria control.
Former colleagues in the Indian Medical Service,
such as SP James, criticised mosquito control, citing
results obtained in Mian Mir (Pakistan). James[10]
(as cited by Nye and Gibson[6]) stated publicly in
the presence of Ross, ‘I will only say that anti-malarial
measures and mosquito-destruction measures are
not, and have never been synonymous terms ... suc-
cess in such operations has often been reported on
evidence that will not bear criticism and is often
ridiculous’. This point of viewwas justifiable at the
time. There had been no compelling demonstration
of the utility of vector sanitation to control malaria.
The Panama Canal changed all of that. It firmly
established vector control as a sound basis for dis-
ease control.
1.2 The Panama Canal
The construction of the PanamaCanal by theUS
represented more than a triumph of engineering ge-
nius, tenacity and national will. The historian Mc-
Cullough[11] wrote, ‘[i]n the history of finance cap-
italism, in the history of medicine, it was an event
of signal consequence’. The importance of the ac-
complishment to medicine may be best appreciated
by understanding the failure that preceded it. In
1881 France began an effort to construct a canal
across the Isthmus of Panama. France invested $287
million and the country’s national prestige. The
project seized the attention of the world. Ferdinand
de Lesseps, the national hero of France and builder
of the Suez Canal, headed the effort.
In 1881 Pasteur’s germ theory of disease had
gained broad acceptance among educated people.
Laveran’s description of plasmodia as the cause of
malaria, reported in 1880, was still 10 years from
similar acceptance. Proof of mosquitoes as vectors
of malaria and yellow fever would wait another 15
years. Through the 8 years of intense French effort
in Panama, McCullough[11] writes, ‘[c]ompany doc-
tors advised staying out of the hot sun and to avoid
getting wet. ... New arrivals were warned against
the night air and were told not to eat fruit’. Most
people earnestly believed that virtuous living pro-
tected against diseases like malaria and yellow fe-
ver. Medical science had little to offer the builders
of the canal and catastrophe ensued.
McCullough[11] wrote of the chief engineer in
Panama, ‘Bunau-Varilla estimated that of every
one hundred new arrivals at least twenty died, and
of those who survived, only twentywere physically
strong enough to do any real work; "and many of
that number had lost the best of their intellectual
value." Others calculated that of every four people
who came out of France at least two, often three,
died of fever’. A cemetery at Gold Hill near the
Culebra Cut holds the graves of nearly a thousand
Frenchmen,womenandchildren from that era.Many
more thousands of lives were lost, mostly labourers
imported from Jamaica and other French colonies.
Among a peak workforce of just under 20 000, ap-
proximately 200 died each month. Even those re-
ceiving the best possible food, housing andmedical
care were vulnerable. The senior French engineer
in Panama, Dingler, in late 1883 brought his wife,
son, daughter and the daughter’s fiancé to Panama,
and all but Dingler were dead of yellow fever by
the end of 1884.
In 1889 the effort in Panama collapsed under the
weight of sickness and death. Investor confidence
crumbled when reliable reports of the catastrophe
reached France. The failure precipitated a national
scandal that ultimately toppled the government and
disgraced national figures of the time: de Lesseps,
Alexandre Gustave Eiffel and Georges Clemenceau.
Tropical vector-borne diseases defeated the most
determined effort of one of the most scientifically
and economically accomplished nations of the day.
On 15August 1914 the ocean steamerAncon tran-
sited the Panama Canal, 10 years after the Americans
began construction. Perhaps the single most impor-
tant difference between the French and American
efforts was the certain knowledge in 1904 that spe-
cific mosquitoes transmitted malaria and yellow
fever. Colonel William Crawford Gorgas had been
withWalter Reed in Cuba and supervised the attack
on mosquitoes in Havana that eradicated yellow
fever and virtually eliminated malaria from what
had been a city of very high risk. Gorgas arrived in
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Panama at the outset of the effort in 1904, person-
ally tasked by President Theodore Roosevelt with
repeating the Havana accomplishment in Panama
City, Colon and the Canal Zone.[11] The success of
vector control during construction at Panama, un-
ambiguously measured in the health and accom-
plishment of a peak workforce of 45 000, proved
that a rational and methodical approach to mos-
quito sanitation prevented otherwise crippling tropi-
cal fevers. An important point from this history is
the success enjoyed without benefit of modern in-
secticides or antimalarials. Attacking the specific
breeding sites of known vectors using crude imple-
ments and the disciplined application of a work-
force of just 4000 men, as well as minimising hu-
man contact with mosquitoes by use of nets and
screens, permitted construction of a canal across
60 miles of deadly jungle. The success of Gorgas
in Panama, made possible by the research accom-
plishments of Ross[8] and Reed et al.,[12] marked
the beginning of the retreat of malaria in the 20th
century and it showed the way. The stage had been
set for the struggle against the vectors of malaria.
1.3 The Global Eradication Campaign
The three decades following the opening of
the Panama Canal brought powerful new weapons
against malaria. The aniline dye industry in Ger-
many had produced families of compounds that
cured malaria and a wide variety of chemicals that
killed or repelled mosquitoes. An important suc-
cess using modern larvicides and household spray-
ing before the advent of DDTwas the complete erad-
ication of Anopheles gambiae from Brazil. That
mosquito is the extraordinarily efficient vector of
malaria in most of Africa. This work in Brazil was
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation and di-
rected by Fred Soper. According to Packard,[13]
‘Soper’s apparent achievements revalidated an ap-
proach to disease control that relied on narrowly
defined technical interventions directed solely at
activities of the mosquito’. The significance of this
achievement may be appreciated by imagining the
intensemalaria transmission of sub-SaharanAfrica
occurring through tropical South America. Soper’s
vector eradication activities over 60 years ago
spared millions of lives and perhaps the economic
vitality of the continent.
The strategic urgencies of World War II spurred
a determined effort to refine and field the new
chemical weapons against malaria. The unpublished
record of the Board for Coordination of Malaria
Studies (5 bound volumes, Washington, DC, 1943-
1946) begins with, ‘[w]hen the supply of quinine
was suddenly cut off by the Japanese invasion of
Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, our Army, Navy,
and Marines faced a deadly serious problem. A long
war in the most malaria-infested areas of the world
lay before them and they were deprived of their only
reliable therapeutic weapon, quinine’. The experi-
ences of military forces in the European, African
and Pacific theatres of action justified these con-
cerns.[14] The strategic importance of malaria as a
serious threat to military forces, reinforced by Amer-
ican experiences in Korea and Vietnam,[14] contin-
ues to influence malaria research across a broad
front.
Chloroquine and DDTwere used by the USmil-
itary by 1944, and within just a few years were in
use around the globe. These chemicals were inex-
pensive, effective and well tolerated with a good
safety profile. Chloroquine cured with relatively
few doses and without the sometimes severe ad-
verse effects of drugs like quinine or atebrine. Per-
haps more importantly, the history of the develop-
ment of chloroquine in Nazi Germany and its
wartime seizure by the US precluded commercial-
isation.[15] The drug was broadly affordable at the
peak of its efficacy. For DDT, a single application
to the interior of a home provided protection against
feeding anophelines through a transmission season.
The stability of DDT allowed maximum coverage
of households at minimal cost. The agricultural ap-
plication of DDT came later, and poisoned the land
and public opinion against it.
The new weapons against malaria spawned ex-
uberant optimism. The title of the book written by
one of the pre-eminent malariologists of themiddle
of the century, Paul Russel,[16] ‘Man’s Mastery of
Malaria’, epitomises this spirit. The eradication of
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malaria seemed feasible and the leading scientists
of the day anticipated it. An uninterrupted string of
extraordinary successes justified the optimism of
that time. Malaria had been fully eradicated from
places where it had always been endemic. For ex-
ample, the eradication of malaria from the US had
been accomplished, where in 1914 an estimated
600 000 cases of malaria had occurred.[17] Faust
and Debakey[18] wrote in 1941, ‘[i]t is true that re-
ported malaria deaths for 1940 were the lowest on
record, totaling 1346 for the entire South, or a rate
of 3.02 per 100,000 population’. Just 59 years later
even this ebbing incidence of death, appearing ‘low’
at the time, seems almost inconceivable. Such a
rate in the US southern states today would yield
more than 5000 deaths annually. The memory of
malaria as a major cause ofmorbidity andmortality
in the US has vanished, but the eradication of ma-
laria in the 1950s justified confidence in the weap-
ons that accomplished the feat.
In May 1955 theWorld Health Assembly adopted
the Global Malaria Eradication Campaign. The
strategy rested on the concept of interruption of trans-
mission by vector control followed by an emphasis
on case detection and treatment. MacDonald[19]
had demonstrated mathematically the feasibility of
this approach to eradication. The United States
Agency for International Development (USAID)
played a major supporting role around the globe in
terms of fiscal resources and technical guidance.[20]
The accomplishment of reduced or eliminated risk
of infection, virtually everywhere except holoen-
demic Africa, was astonishing (fig. 2). Malaria dis-
appeared from the US, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Spain,
Italy, the Balkans, Greece and northern Africa, re-
gions that had been seasonally malarious through
history. Successes even occurred in the tropics.
Malaria was eradicated across vast stretches of the
South Pacific, including the tropical northern tier
of Australia. Malaria disappeared from the Greater
and Lesser Antilles archipelagos, with the excep-
tion of the island of Hispaniola (Haiti and Domi-
nica). The significance of this accomplishment
may be appreciated by British military statistics
from the Caribbean region for the period 1895 to
1904; 104.2 malaria admissions to hospital with
1.42 deaths per 1000 European troops per year, and
120 admissions and 2.5 deaths per 1000 West In-
dian troops per year.[24]
Success was not limited to eradication per se.
Malaria was brought under control across vast tropi-
cal zones where meso-, hyper- and holoendemic ma-
laria had always prevailed. On Java, an island over
600 miles in length and home to almost 100 million
people, widespread hyper- and holoendemic ma-
laria was rolled back to a few hypoendemic foci
and occasional outbreaks at scattered locations.[23]
The US International Cooperation Administration
(the predecessor of USAID) in collaboration with
WHO and the fledgling Republic of Indonesia be-
gan DDT spraying campaigns in Java and else-
where in 1951. In Central Java the slide positive
rate fell from 24% to less than 1% between 1953
and 1959.[23] Todaymalaria transmission rarely oc-
curs in East and West Java, and fewer than a dozen
hypoendemic foci persist in Central Java.[25] DDT
spraying campaigns inMadagascar during the 1950s
1
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Fig. 2. The retreat of malaria between 1937 and 1969 (adapted
from data reported by Jukes,[21] Sharma[22] and Atmosoed-
jono[23]).
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pushed malaria transmission to vanishingly low
levels on the vast central highland plateau.[3,26] In
Sri Lanka, the number of cases fell from over 2 mil-
lion in 1946 to less than 100 in 1963.[21] In Guyana,
George Giglioli supervised a DDT spraying cam-
paign between 1947 and 1951 that eliminated ma-
laria transmission from the heavily populated coastal
area.[27] Figure 2 illustrates data reported by Jukes[21]
and other sources revealing the sharp decline in
reported malaria between 1937 and 1969.
Perhaps the most compelling successes of the
Global EradicationCampaign, by virtue of the daunt-
ing scale of geography and human population,
were Brazil and India. Brazil during the 1950s had
5 million cases each year and by 1960 the number
of cases fell to just 50 000.[28] In India before 1945
an estimated 75 million new cases occurred each
year, with 800 000 deaths.[22] Out of a total popu-
lation of 466 million people in 1965, 373 million
had been freed of risk of malaria.[29] Eradication
had been achieved in 56% of the population by 1968
and only 10% remained in the DDT attack phase.
In 1964 the annual parasite index (number of cases
per 1000 population) was 0.00098, or roughly 1
case of malaria among 1 million people.[22] The
breathtaking success of the India story is recorded
in the fact that no deaths caused by malaria were
recorded in 1968. The lives of nearly a million peo-
ple each year had been spared and DDT spraying
largely accounted for the accomplishment.
In a retrospective view that includes the current
resurgence of malaria, the gain made against ma-
laria during the period 1945 to 1965 stands out as
an astonishing success by almost anymeasure. The
degree of success appears all the more remarkable
in view of the fact that few international agencies
took the campaign seriously enough to offer sub-
stantial support. According to Packard,[30] ‘[m]any
health authorities, both within and outside the As-
sembly, [WHO] viewed eradication as at best fool
hardy, and at worst, potentially disastrous’. The
USAID embraced the strategy and contributed
$1.2 billion between 1950 and 1972.[20] In contrast,
the WHO put up $20.3 million between 1956 and
1963, and $17.5 million of that was contributed by
the US. Only $2.8 million was donated for the ef-
fort by all other nations combined.[29] The Global
Eradication Campaign was, in a fiscal sense, a uni-
lateral initiative of the US. Other leading developed
nations largely rejected the campaign. France and
the UK, with general accord among governments
in Africa, stand out as examples.[29] The primary
‘failure’ of the Global Eradication Campaign may
have been political rather than operational or tech-
nical. If one retrospectively supplants the unrealis-
tic goal of eradication with one of control, the cam-
paign appears brilliantly successful. Unfortunately,
the value of the campaign has been measured in
large part by its failure to actually eradicatemalaria
in much of the tropics, or to affect malaria in
holoendemic Africa, where it was never applied.
1.4 Legacy of the Global 
Eradication Campaign
Unabated intense transmission in holoendemic
Africa contributed substantially to disillusionment
with the Global Eradication Campaign. Ironically,
the abatement of malaria almost everywhere else
rendered the lack of progress in Africa especially
conspicuous. Today, in the long shadow of the
‘failure’ of eradication, global policy makers have
focuseduponholoendemicAfrica.Authoritativestra-
tegic thinking in malaria control carries a distinctly
African frame of reference. The emphasis on Af-
rica in the World Declaration on the Control of
Malaria and Global Malaria Control Strategy is ex-
plicit. According to Trigg and Kondrachine,[29] the
document has been ‘confirmed by the World Health
Assembly in 1993, and by both the Forty-ninth
Session of the United Nations General Assembly
and the Thirty-third Ordinary Session of the As-
sembly of Heads of State and Government of the
Organisation of African Unity in 1994 and 1997,
respectively’. Trigg and Kondrachine[29] summa-
rise by writing, ‘[t]he strategy calls for disease-
rather than parasite-oriented control programmes.
... The strategy is firmly rooted in the primary
healthcare approach ...’. This global strategy aims
to diminish disease caused by malaria through de-
veloping effective diagnosis and treatment through
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a primary healthcare instrument. The details of ap-
proach and the emphasis on Africa following this
strategy may be found in the Multilateral Initiative
againstMalaria in Africa and theRoll BackMalaria
campaign. The WHO has emphasised the applica-
tion of this strategy with priority given to the cre-
ation of national malaria control programmes in
sub-Saharan Africa, and the ‘reorienting’ of exist-
ing programmes in the rest of the world, ‘in line
with the principles of the global strategy’.[29]
The rationale for the new WHO policy lies in
the epidemiology of disease and death caused by
malaria in holoendemic Africa. The risk of severe
anaemia and cerebral malaria in infants, very young
children and pregnant women, especially primi-
gravidae, is extraordinarily high in holoendemic
Africa. In contrast, older children and adults have
little or no risk of disease despite virtually every-
one being infected at least several times per year.
Thus, abatement of severe anaemia and cerebral ma-
laria among infants, young children and pregnant
women lies at the core of strategic thinking in the
GlobalMalaria Control Strategy. Improved clinical
management of disease and protection measures
directed at this narrow segment of the population
constitute the basis of measures intended to reduce
the burden of death and disease caused by malaria.
The distinct epidemiology of disease and death
caused by malaria outside Africa bears consider-
ation in formulating and accepting control strate-
gies. In Asia and the Americas the risk of infection
is relatively low, but the risk of disease or death
with infection is relatively high. This represents the
converse of the African scenario. Should interven-
tion against low risk of infection and high risk of
disease or death be deferred to the point of disease?
Moreover, risk of disease and death is not focused
upon a narrow segment of the population. The bear-
ing of resources intended to intervene against dis-
ease and death may thus be expected to be corre-
spondingly diffused and less efficacious. Finally,
the focus onmalaria control in holoendemicAfrica,
driven by the fact that most malaria now occurs
there, defers engagement of the threat of resurgent
malaria. Malaria in other regions, largely the entire
length of southern Asia and Central and South
America, accounts almost entirely for the ‘global’
resurgence of malaria. In contrast, malaria in most
of sub-SaharanAfrica is hyper- to holoendemic and
has been that way through history. Although in-
creasing resistance to antimalarials threatens higher
risk of severe disease and death (in infants, young
children and pregnant women),[31] the absolute
number of infections and the geographic range of
malaria in holoendemic Africa remain stable. Ad-
dressing the spreading geographic range and in-
creasing incidence of malaria outside Africa may
require the development of intervention strategies
aimed at reducing risk of infection rather than dis-
ease with infection.
2. Malaria in Resurgence: 1970 to Today
The resurgence of malaria that has occurred
since the late 1960s is generally acknowledged.
According to Campbell,[32] ‘... there has been a dra-
matic, worldwide increase in malaria-related ill-
ness and death over the past two decades’. Accord-
ing to Kondrachine and Trigg,[33] ‘[a]n increasing
number of malaria epidemics has been documented
throughout the world’. According to the Institute
of Medicine of the National Academy of Sci-
ences,[34] ‘[m]alaria which had been eliminated or
effectively suppressed in many parts of the world,
is undergoing a resurgence’. Incidence of clinical
disease caused bymalaria has increased in endemic
areas, and malaria has encroached into areas con-
sidered free of risk for several decades.
Even in the US, recent outbreaks of malaria have
occurred inCalifornia, Texas,NewJersey,NewYork,
Michigan, Virginia and Florida[17] (unpublished
data). Competent anopheline vectors are seasonally
abundant in North America, and repatriated travel-
lers to or migrants from endemic areas carrying ga-
metocytes may infect these mosquito populations.
However, imported malaria accounts for the vast
majority of reported cases in the US. During the
1960s and 1970s fewer than 50 cases of malaria
were reported in US civilians. This number has
climbed steadily to over 500 per year at present,
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and the number of actual cases is estimated to be 2
to 3 times higher.[35]
Increasingly frequent travel to and from the trop-
ics partly explains such statistics, but these trends
nonetheless reflect an overall greater risk of infec-
tion. An enduring cycle of transmission in the US
or Europe leading to endemic malaria is highly un-
likely because the level of healthcare available to
almost all people virtually precludes the possibility
of permanent infectious pools of carriers. Never-
theless, migration from endemic zones into sub-
tropical and temperate areas lacking the highest
standards of medical care indeed threatens the rein-
troduction of endemic malaria. Once re-established,
the control or eradication of endemic malaria may
prove monumentally difficult in the absence of in-
struments of control like chloroquine and DDT.
Clear evidence of the global resurgence of ma-
laria emerges piecemeal from many sources, mostly
WHO surveillance statistics. Although some coun-
tries still report relatively stable or declining ma-
laria (e.g. Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nepal,
Bhutan, Thailand, Oman and Saudi Arabia[36,37]),
encroachment and resurgence appears to be the
rule. Malaria had been eradicated from Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan in the 1960s, and only
about 200 annual cases were recorded in the years
before 1994, when suddenly over 3000 cases were
reported.[37] Falciparum malaria has reappeared in
Tadjikistan for the first time in 35 years.[37] An es-
timated 2 to 3 million annual cases of malaria now
occur in Afghanistan.[36] There were 8700 cases of
vivax malaria in Turkey in 1990, and 84 345 cases
in 1994.[37] In Iraq 3400 cases were reported in
1989 compared with 98 222 cases in 1994.[36] Syria
has had increasing numbers of vivax malaria cases
since the 1980s.[36]
South Korea has seen a logarithmic increase in
vivax malaria since it reappeared in 1993 (see fig.
3).[38] In Bangladesh 33 000 cases of malaria were
reported in 1988 and 166 564 in 1994.[37] The num-
ber of infections in Bhutan has increased by about
a third between 1992 and 1994.[37] In Sri Lanka the
number of cases in 1982 was 38 500, and in 1987
peaked at 676 000; in 1994 273 000 cases oc-
curred.[37] The great strides made against malaria
in India during the 1950s began to deteriorate in the
late 1960s. In themid 1960s the number of reported
malaria cases was always less than 200 000 per
annum. In just 10 years, by 1976, the number of
cases surged to 6.45 million.[22] Since that time up
to the mid 1990s, the number stabilised at around
2 million cases annually. Malaria in Indonesia ap-
pears to be decreasing,[37] but this may be the result
of exceptional reporting on the heavily populated
islands of Java and Bali, where aggressive surveil-
lance and vector control continue to flourish. Change
in the malaria status on the outer islands of Indo-
nesia, like most remote areas in the tropics, is largely
unknown. The widespread practice of self-treatment
leaves many millions of cases unreported.
In Brazil, over 700 000 cases occurred in 1991,
up more than 10-fold from the number of annual
cases in the early 1960s.[36] ThePanAmericanHealth
Organization (PAHO) statistics reported by Rob-
erts et al.[39] show the proportion of malaria posi-
tive blood film examinations in Brazil to have in-
creased from less than 5% in the 1970s to >15% in
the early 1990s and rising to above 20% in the mid
1990s. Similar statistics are described for Guyana
and Peru.[39] Peru reported 32 000 cases in 1988
and 127 000 in 1994, and falciparum malaria has
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Fig. 3. Logarithmically increasing scale of transmission of Plas-
modium vivax in South Korea near the Demilitarized Zone.[38]
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re-emerged.[37] Reported malaria cases in Belize
increased 3-fold between 1991 and 1994 (to 9957
cases).[37]
During the early 1970s the number of reported
malaria cases in South Africa totalled less than
2000, whereas in 1993 and 1994 over 13 000 and
10 000 cases, respectively, were reported.[40] In
Madagascar, malaria suddenly reappeared in epi-
demic fashion in 1987, quickly re-established
hyperendemicity and remains so today.[41] High-
land areas of Kenya have recently experienced an
increasing number of epidemics of malaria.[42]
Djibouti and Somalia have also experienced sharp
increases in malaria rates in the wake of the disrup-
tion of social services by war.[36]
In the patchwork of data collected from many
sources and by as many means, an unmistakable
trend toward deterioration of the malaria situation
emerges. Most of the available global data are at
least 5 years old and there is little reason to expect
that newer data will reveal anything but further de-
terioration. Malaria is spreading at an alarming
rate, with more sharply rising numbers of cases in
endemic areas, and encroachment into areas where
it had been nearly or completely eradicated. The
resurgence does not extend to the holoendemic
areas of Africa for the simple reasons that its mea-
sure in incidence normally resides at ceiling values
and its geographic range has never retreated.
3. What Explains the Resurgence 
of Malaria?
Many factors account for the global resurgence
of malaria. The hierarchy of importance for these
factors varies across a wide array of conditions.
Political, social and economic forces may be espe-
cially difficult to sort out and often profoundly in-
fluence the risk of infection. The social upheaval
of war in the tropics often provokes epidemic ma-
laria. Likewise, region-specific physical and mete-
orological factors create isolated outbreaks, e.g.
unusually heavy monsoons causing epidemic ma-
laria in Rajasthan during 1994,[43] and epidemic
malaria in the highlands of Irian Jaya, Indonesia
during the El Nino weather anomalies (MJ Bangs
andMinistry of Health, Republic of Indonesia, per-
sonal communications). Credible evidence sug-
gests that global warming may be responsible for
outbreaks of malaria at higher elevations.[44] The
availability of healthcare and its quality also influ-
ence risk, as does the capacity to conduct sustain-
able vector control activities.
This review does not attempt a universal scope
of factors that may have contributed to the resur-
gence of malaria. Instead, the analysis presented
here accepts the premise that the increased risk of
malaria relates to changes in key factors that brought
about the global retreat of malaria. In that context
chloroquine treatment and DDT spraying stand
prominently as signposts to a broader explanation.
These two substances played dominant roles against
malaria between 1945 and 1965. The emergence of
resistance to chloroquine and the deterioration of
the national programmes that applied DDT have
been coincident with the resurgence of malaria. A
broad basis of evidence at least supports the view
that these factors may be linked in a cause and ef-
fect relationship. In any event, examination of these
factors is useful because treatment and prevention
dominate aspects of public health policies for the
control of malaria. Thus, examining the loss of
chloroquine to resistance and the sharp decline in
DDT spraying may help the development of a ra-
tionale for alternative strategies.
3.1 Resistance to Chloroquine
The emergence of resistance to chloroquine prob-
ably represents the single most important factor
contributing to the global resurgence of malaria.
Chloroquine now fails to cure most infections ac-
quired in most endemic areas. The current impor-
tance of chloroquine for the treatment of malaria
may be difficult to grasp given its inferior thera-
peutic properties compared with other standard an-
timalarials. The generally sustained efficacy of
quinine and the availability of antimalarials such
as mefloquine and halofantrine seem to offer suit-
able alternatives to chloroquine. The key to under-
standing why that is not true for almost all of the
people exposed to malaria may be found in the so-
728 Baird
© Adis International Limited. All rights reserved. Drugs 2000 Apr; 59 (4)
cial and economic setting of the impoverished rural
tropics.
Chloroquine remains widely used in the tropics
despite its inability to achieve cure (chloroquine
sensitivity persists only in Central America, the
Caribbean and parts of the Middle East). People
living in rural areas with severely limited financial
resources represent the vast majority of new ma-
laria infections each year. In these areas chloroquine
is sold over the counter at low cost. Most people in
the rural tropics do not have routine access to a
healthcare provider and treat themselves without
benefit of medical evaluation and counsel. In this
context the relatively infrequent use of quinine or
other effective antimalarials may be understood.
Most people taking quinine experience a range of
mildly to severely unpleasant adverse effects such
as tinnitus, vertigo and nausea lasting through the
5 to 10 days of several daily doses. These adverse
effects often obscure the recovery from malaria.
The punishing treatment costs about $5.00 (about
1 day of wages) for the 20 to 30 tablets, and few
manage the good compliance necessary for cure.
In contrast, a regimen of chloroquine usually costs
much less than $1.00 for the 5 to 10 tablets (often
about $US0.20), and the patient almost always
feels better within 24 hours, with nearly complete
clinical recovery after 72 hours. In Indonesia, vir-
tually all patients experienced clinical recovery,
even where the risk of RIII resistance was rela-
tively high.[45] This was also true in Guyana, South
America (JK Baird & T Tiwari, unpublished data).
The high risk of recurrent parasitaemia with chlor-
oquine therapy must be weighed against that with
inadequate compliance to quinine and the likeli-
hood of reinfection within the month or two fol-
lowing treatment. The self-treating poor of the ru-
ral tropics will opt for more rapid recovery at lower
cost, even if incomplete and with a high risk of
recurrence. Most chloroquine users fail to appreci-
ate that inadequate treatment contributes to the risk
of infection among their family members and
neighbours.
In addition to poor therapeutic performance,
other characteristics of chloroquine account for the
heightened risk to the community in the face of
resistance. Chloroquine lingers in the bloodstream
long after treatment. One month after a peak con-
centration of about 1200 μg/L on day 2 of standard
therapy, concentrations averaging about 100 μg/L
whole blood remain.[46] Chloroquine treatment has
no inhibitory effect on the infectivity of Plasmo-
dium falciparum gametocytes to anopheline mos-
quitoes. Chloroquine actually enhanced infectivity
to anophelines relative to treatment with pyrimeth-
amine/sulfadoxine in humans.[47] Aperson treating
a chloroquine-resistant infection with chloroquine
will (1) feel better quickly at relatively low cost,
(2) maintain an asymptomatic parasitaemia for
several weeks or more, (3) cull out chloroquine-
sensitive parasites, leaving resistant trophozoites
to differentiate to gametocytes, and (4) remain in-
fectious to anopheline mosquitoes. Chloroquine
creates the potential for large pools of asymptom-
atic carriers of drug-resistant strains that readily in-
fect mosquitoes.
Chloroquine use in the face of resistance pro-
motes transmission. Effectively communicating this
problem to lay chloroquine users may be very diffi-
cult. Solving these problems may require supplant-
ing chloroquine with a safely self-administered
drug that costs less and works better. The technical
and economic difficulty of doing so has proven oner-
ous. There is no drug now available that approaches
the utility of chloroquine at the zenith of its effi-
cacy, nor is one foreseen. The failure to develop an
alternative to chloroquine for people living in the
rural tropics virtually assures the longevity of the
use of this drug and the problems it engenders.
Resistance to chloroquine byPlasmodium vivax
was first confirmed in 1989 from Papua New
Guinea.[48] It has since been documented in Indo-
nesia, Myanmar, India and Guyana.[49-53] On the
northern coast of Irian Jaya (Indonesian New
Guinea), half of the dozens of patients evaluated
were again parasitaemic 14 days after receiving su-
pervised chloroquine therapy.[50,54] Most patients
seeking treatment for confirmed vivax malaria at
clinic in the same area already had ordinarily cura-
tive concentrations of chloroquine in their blood.[55]
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In that region, one of the few adequately studied,
resistance to chloroquine accounts for most clinical
vivax malaria. This problem poses a very serious
threat to public health wherever vivax malaria oc-
curs. The potential loss of chloroquine to resistance
by P. vivax in Asia and the Americas would almost
certainly exacerbate the resurgence of malaria al-
ready occurring in those regions.
3.2 Repudiation of DDT and the
Deterioration of Vector Control Programmes
In the public consciousness, DDT represents an
icon of the capacity of technology to do harm. This
pesticide conjures the spectre of environmental de-
struction and damaged health. This view fails tomake
the key conceptual separation of crop pest control
from the spraying of interior walls in homes to con-
trol vectors of human disease.
DDT applied to the interior of homes differs rad-
ically in terms of quantities and environmental
consequence from DDT applied to large tracts of
arable, well drained land. In 1971, the year before
the US banned the agricultural application of DDT,
71million kilograms were sprayed in the US alone.
This dusting of an appreciable portion of the US
occurred every year for more than 20 years. The
relative stability of DDT in the environment and its
high affinity for fatty tissues established a marked
bioaccumulation, notably in several raptor bird
species, including the American bald eagle.[21] The
most serious adverse effect to human health was
reported in a study suggesting a link between DDT
concentrations in human adipose tissue and risk of
breast cancer,[56] but definitive studies invalidated
that association.[57-59] According to the 1991 Insti-
tute of Medicine report on malaria,[60] DDT ‘re-
mains one of the most effective insecticides for ma-
laria control efforts in endemic countries. Compared
with other available insecticides, it is inexpensive
and, importantly, is nontoxic to humans’. The re-
port continues, ‘the use of DDT as a residual indoor
spray does not introduceDDT into the environment
in amounts sufficient to enter the food chain, and
thus this usage does not have adverse ecological
consequences’. It is difficult to reconcile the almost
complete retraction of DDT from strategic thinking
on malaria control with the sentiment expressed in
that report.
Social pressure not to apply DDT, sometimes
extreme, comes from international aid agencies
and from non-governmental environmental groups
that equate synthetic insecticide use with destruc-
tion of the environment. According to Sharp and le
Sueur,[40] ‘[s]ocial attitudes against the use of DDT
have increased to the degree that certain interna-
tional research funding agencies will no longer
fund research in any way associated with DDT’.
Cursory inspection of funding opportunities from
a wide variety of agencies engaged in malaria re-
search bears out that sentiment. In the context of
mainstream scientific endeavour in the interest of
public health in the tropics, DDT appears to have
been eliminated as a topic, except for exploration
of harmful effects. Most informed people agree
that DDT creates risks to health and habitat, but
debate surrounds estimation of the risk-to-benefit
ratio that weighs the burden of vector-borne infec-
tious diseases.
The general repudiation of DDT spraying, to-
gether with the shift in policy away from spraying
strategies, has contributed substantially to the de-
terioration of vector control programmes in the de-
veloping world. Trigg and Kondrachine[29] attrib-
uted the resurgence in malaria during the 1980s and
1990s in part to the reluctance of governments to
move away from ‘practices used during the eradi-
cation era’, including the spraying of residual in-
secticides such as DDT. The authors stressed inap-
propriate application of DDT in this context, but
the assertion emphasises the extent to which au-
thoritative agencies have turned away from vector
control as a viable instrument of controlling infec-
tion. The WHO has recently launched two impor-
tant initiatives representing concrete steps toward
implementing the 1993 declaration of a new global
malaria control strategy. The Roll Back Malaria
campaign (WHO, UNICEF, UNDP and the World
Bank) lists objectives that do not include vector
control activities beyond insecticide-treated bed
nets.[61] The Multilateral Initiative for Malaria also
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fails to address vector control issues outside Af-
rica. Diminishing reliance on insecticide spraying
campaigns as an instrument of control has been
described in the context of ‘progress’ in control by
theWHO.[62] TheWHOdoes not stand alone in this
position. Many other leading agencies have ac-
tively and passively discouraged national malaria
control policies that focus on the spraying of insec-
ticides, especially DDT. The decline to collapse of
vector control programmes, which has already oc-
curred in many tropical nations, should be antici-
pated in this social and political milieu.
Apart from social pressures and the charac-
terisation of the spraying campaigns of the 1950s
and 1960s as a failure, what accounts for the reluc-
tance to sustain a commitment to residual spraying
programmes as an instrument of control? Some au-
thorities obviously believe the clinical approach
will better control disease in the community, or that
resistance to DDT has rendered it ineffective as an
instrument of control. Many authorities argue that
vector control has not proven sustainable in devel-
oping nations. Compelling evidence to support these
views is lacking. The best available evidence indi-
cates that declining vector control, along with in-
adequate treatment and diagnosis, may be driving
the resurgence of malaria outside holoendemic Af-
rica.
3.3 Vector Control Activity and Malaria
Attack Rates
A causal link between the deterioration of vec-
tor control programmes and the global resurgence
of malaria is difficult to establish, but supporting
evidence is widely available. In the review of the
resurgence of malaria on Madagascar, Fontinille et
al.[63] blamed the situation on the collapse of vector
control activities, as did Mouchet et al..[3] Figure 4
illustrates data from Sri Lanka reported by Jukes[21]
that is typical of that surrounding the cessation of
DDT spraying. A resurgence of malaria occurs af-
ter DDT spraying programmes are terminated or
allowed to deteriorate. Sharma[22] provides a de-
tailed account of the success and subsequent col-
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Fig. 4. Malaria in Sri Lanka before and after cessation of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) spraying in 1963 (adapted from data
reported by Jukes[21]).
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lapse of malaria control in India during the 1960s
and 1970s. This extraordinary history provides a
glimpse at the complexities and operational diffi-
culties of a large nationalmalaria control programme.
Sharma listed shortages of DDT and other opera-
tional setbacks among the major factors behind the
resurgence of malaria in India. He conceded that
vector resistance to DDT may have contributed, but
pointed out that most important vectors in India
failed to develop resistance to DDT, and malaria
carried by those species also resurged, ‘with equal
vengeance’. Sharma noted sharp reductions in spray-
ing activities as a permanent feature of control ac-
tivities during 1992 to 1994, that ‘... produced a
rapid deterioration in the malaria situation’.
An analysis by Roberts et al.[39] described an
inverse relationship between declining DDT house
spray rates and rising standardised annual parasite
index, using data from nations in the Americas be-
tween 1959 and 1995 reported by PAHO. Increas-
ing infection rates accompanied proportionately di-
minishing house spray rates. Correlation does not
prove causality, but the analysis begs an explana-
tion. Likewise, the view that shifting malaria con-
trol activities to diagnosis and treatment improves
the malaria situation also demands proof. Unlike
the launch of vector control with the accomplish-
ments of Gorgas in Panama and Soper in Brazil,
there has been no compelling demonstration of the
effectiveness of the strategy for control in the pri-
mary healthcare setting. Available data offer little
as a basis for confidence. For example, during a 5-
year study at Antioquia, Colombia, the annual blood
examination rate (ABER) increased from 17% to
82% (reflecting a shift in emphasis), while the an-
nual parasite index (API, cases per 1000 people at
risk) increased from 38 to 87.[64] This may be an
artifact of more aggressive case detection, but the
approach demands vindication in data demonstrat-
ing diminished risk of infection in communities
where it is applied. PAHO recently attributed a
63% reduction in the P. falciparum crude mortality
rate (from 8.3 deaths/100 000 exposed in 1994 to
3.0 in 1998) in the Americas to ‘Implementation of
the GMCS [Global Malaria Control Strategy] in
the Region ...’, i.e. case detection and treatment.[65]
However, the 307 deaths reported in 1998 were
based on preliminary data, and the accuracy of such
statistics may vary to such an extent as to render
such comparisons unreliable. Advocates of control
based on clinical interventions in lieu of vector
control should execute and publish the results of
studies designed to test the hypotheses relevant to
this issue. Such work may serve as a basis for
meaningful deliberation of the issue in the scien-
tific literature.
3.4 Vector Resistance to DDT and 
Resurgent Malaria
Resistance to DDT by anopheline vectors has
been widely cited as an important factor contribut-
ing to the global resurgence of malaria. However,
the available data fail to support that view. No
study has unequivocally linked DDT resistance to
an increase in malaria attack rates. Brogdon and
McAllister[66] write, ‘careful scrutiny of current in-
formation about vector resistance shows that the full
effect of resistance on control efforts is not known’.
The lack of evidence on this question raises the
possibility that DDT resistance has little effect on
control activities. Indeed, one hypothesis suggests
that physiological resistance is of little or no con-
sequence to control, and that so-called ‘behavioral
resistance’ may actually enhance the performance
of DDT as an instrument of prevention.
This concept was explained by Roberts and An-
dre.[67] Physiological or biochemical resistance is
gauged by mortality, whereas behavioural resis-
tance is a function of excito-repellency. Mosqui-
toes may develop resistance to insecticides either
by adapting behaviours that remove them from
contact or by becoming repelled at the scent. The
protective effects of DDT may rely upon repel-
lency rather than mortality, i.e. simply reducing the
likelihood of contact between humans and mosqui-
toes without necessarily killingmosquitoes.Where
this is true, the importance of behavioural resis-
tance supersedes that of resistance to killing (as
measured in standardised tests for insecticide resis-
tance), and may promote protection conferred by
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DDT spraying in homes. This was the finding in
the exhaustive studies reported by Bangs.[68] It is
remarkable that more than 50 years after the launch
of DDT spraying on amassive scale, little is known
of how the insecticide actually works. This reflects
one of the true failures of the Global Eradication
Campaign; its neglect of research as a necessary
complement to operations left important questions
unanswered.
3.5 Social Momentum for the 
Elimination of DDT
A global ban on DDT production is being pur-
sued by a number of organisations dedicated to
protecting the environment from human activities.
TheWorldWildlife Fund has announced a strategic
plan for accomplishing the global ban on DDT by
the year 2007.[69] TheUnitedNations Environmen-
tal Programme (UNEP) appears to be the most likely
instrument of such a ban. The argument presented
in this review is that DDT has been an extraordi-
narily useful tool against malaria. The best available
data suggest that DDT indoor spraying remains ef-
fective and does not harm the environment or hu-
man health, and authoritative sources have sup-
ported this view.[60] On the other hand, leading
international agencies actively discourage DDT
spraying campaigns. This contradiction largely
captures the schism that exists in the community
of malaria workers. Residual DDT spraying as a
method of controlling malaria has been repudiated
by those believing a better approach is possible.
Others perceive the failure to apply DDT in the
face of a global malaria crisis as irresponsible in
the absence of proven or practical alternatives.
Social pressure against DDT is immense. Many
communities in the tropics would almost certainly
reject its use in their homes. It seems likely, how-
ever, that the decision would hinge upon the sever-
ity of malaria in the community. The suddenness
and cross-sectional attack of epidemic malaria ter-
rifies. Stricken communities may embrace almost
anymeasure of protection in the faceof such a serious
and immediate threat. The resurgence of malaria
around the globe allows a reasonable forecast of
more and more epidemics. Many millions of peo-
ple with severely limited resources face a rapidly
growing risk of epidemic malaria. What tools will
be brought to bear on the problem? If a global ban
on DDT production is realised, that tool vanishes.
Tacit approval of the ban on DDT by the commu-
nity of science, and the encouragement to disman-
tle the infrastructure of residual insecticide spray-
ing programmes, comes with a very heavy burden
of responsibility to the people facing resurgent ma-
laria.
4. Regaining Control of Malaria
The global resurgence in malaria followed a gen-
eral breakdown in malaria control programmes.
The basis of failure has been attributed to the re-
luctance to reorient away from vector control and
toward diagnosis and treatment,[29] whereas others
attribute it to deteriorating vector control activi-
ties.[39] These opposing views may be reconciled
through conceptual separation of malaria in Africa
from the rest of the world. Controlling malaria
morbidity and mortality through emphasis on di-
agnosis and treatment in a primary healthcare set-
ting is a sensible approach in holoendemic Africa
but not necessarily elsewhere. In Asia and the Amer-
icas, where malaria is resurgent, the best available
evidence argues for control activities focused on
the vector, using residual repellent insecticides in
dwellings. There should be fundamentally distinct
strategies for Africa versus elsewhere, but in both
settings poor people treating their infections need
affordable drugs that work well and safely without
medical supervision. Chloroquine needs to be abol-
ished where it no longer cures, but nothing less than
a drug that works better at lower cost could accom-
plish that.
4.1 Conceptual Separation of Malaria in
Africa from Elsewhere
Malaria in holoendemic Africa is singular in its
intensity and intransigence. The global resurgence
ofmalaria does not include holoendemicAfrica be-
cause no substantial gains against risk of infection
have been made (outside urban areas) on most of
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the continent. North Africa, subtropical southern
Africa and the region of the Horn are exceptions.
Malaria control activities based largely on DDT
spraying brought about a retreat of malaria in those
regions, and a resurgence has followed the deteri-
oration of those programmes.[3] Although the geo-
graphical range and number of infections in holo-
endemic Africa cannot be considered resurgent, the
rising tide of resistance to available antimalarials
threatens the effectiveness of treatment regimens.
The threat of increasing risk of severe disease and
death caused by drug resistance looms across holo-
endemic Africa, but only for those at risk, i.e. in-
fants, small children and pregnant women.
The risk of severe disease among very young Af-
rican children and primigravid women is relatively
high even in the absence of drug resistance. Almost
everyone else in holoendemicAfrica has a very low
risk of severe disease by virtue of naturally acquired
immunity. The risk of severe disease among older
children and adults is vanishingly low despite very
high risk of infection (approximately >500% per
year). Thus, control of disease in young children and
pregnant women, rather than limiting risk of infec-
tion among everyone, constitutes the focus and hope
formalaria control inAfrica. However, the suitabil-
ity of this approach for the rest of the world seems
doubtful. The basis of doubt may be found in com-
paring the dynamics of malaria transmission and
disease in Africa with that elsewhere (table I).
The most important distinguishing feature of
Africanmalaria is the risk of infection. The incidence
of new infection in sub-Saharan Africa is much
higher than any place else. Measured rates typically
reach 8 infections per person-year.[70] The north coast
of the island of New Guinea has the highest mea-
sured attack rates outside the Sahel, ranging from
1 to 5 infections per person-year.[71] In most other
places the risk of infection is relatively low. The
incidence of malaria in the rural Amazon of Brazil,
for example, appears to be about 0.1 infections per
person-year.[72] Setting aside healthcare considera-
tions, risk of infection by P. falciparum generally
equates with risk of death in most of the tropics.
The risk of death without acquired immune or che-
motherapeutic intervention is not known, but any-
where between 5% and 50% seems probable. In
contrast, risk of death is a small fraction of the risk
of infection in the Sahel. This distinction has far-
reaching implications with regard to strategies in-
tended to diminish morbidity and mortality caused
by malaria.
A hypothetical analysis illustrates this point. An
attack rate of 0.2 infections per person-year in a
region of 100 000 people would yield an annual
average of 20 000 cases of malaria, or each person
being infected about once every 5 years. Control
strategies that reduce the risk of infection by 50%
would prevent 10 000 cases, each case carrying a
much higher risk of death or debilitating disease
relative to one in holoendemic Africa. In contrast,
an attack rate of 5 infections per person-year in a
region of 100 000 people would yield 500 000 in-
fections, or each person being infected 5 times an-
Table I. Distinctions between malaria in Asia and America, versus Africa
Endemic Asia and America Holoendemic Africa
Risk of infection Very low Very high
Risk of death with infection Very high Very low
Population at risk of death All ages Infants, small children and
primigravid women
Acquired immunity No Yes
Reduction in people infected with 50% effective control 50% 0%
Risk of control None Diminished naturally acquired
immunity
History of vector control Effective Not applied
History of effective control Yes No
History of eradication Yes No
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nually. Reducing the risk of infection by 50% in
this instance would result in 2.5 infections per per-
son per year. Thus, despite reducing the attack rate
2-fold, the annual risk of infection would remain
in excess of 100% for all residents. The efficacy of
control measures with regard to preventing infec-
tion among individuals depends upon the attack
rate. Effective control measures in an area like Su-
matra may have little utility in, for example, Bur-
kina Faso. Likewise, control of malaria by focus-
ing control resources on attacking clinical disease
in Sumatra may allow otherwise preventable expo-
sure to risk of infection with attendant high risk of
severe disease and death.
An important variable in these considerations is
naturally acquired immunity. The plot shown in fig-
ure 5 illustrates a hypothetical change in risk of
disease in relation to exposure to infection. Up to
a point where natural immunity begins to diminish
risk of disease, that risk rises proportionate to the
risk of infection (segment A). Natural immunity
consolidates with increasing exposure to infection
(segment B). Adults in holoendemic Africa rarely
suffer severe disease caused by malaria (segment
C). This protection is the product of poorly under-
stood immune factors related to age and recent ex-
posure to infection.[73] The threshold of infection
(the frequency of exposure) required to maintain
acquired immune protection remains unknown.
One series of studies suggests that 2 to 6 infections
per yearmay suffice.[74] If this is true, reducing risk
of infection may increase risk of disease. An anal-
ysis of risk of disease under various endemic set-
tings in Africa by Snow et al.[75] suggested such a
scenario. Assuming a protective threshold of 3 in-
fections per year, reducing the risk of infection
from 5 to 1 infection per year would hypothetically
render the majority of people more susceptible to
disease (i.e. moving from segment C to segment B
of fig. 5). On the other hand, very high incidence
density of infection correlates with risk of severe
malarial anaemia[76] and reducing that burden may
save lives while preventing infection in relatively
few (i.e. moving from segment D to segment C).
Many studies of insecticide-treated bed nets
demonstrate protection from death in holoendemic
Africa and seem consistent with this view. The com-
plex and poorly understood nuances of naturally
acquired immunity and high risk of multiple infec-
tions each year should not confound control strat-
egies outside Africa (NewGuinea is an exception).
For almost everyone outside holoendemic Africa,
only segment A of figure 5 is relevant, i.e. risk of
severe disease increases proportionately with risk
of exposure.
The best approach to reducing risk of disease
constitutes the core question for strategies for the
control of malaria. The African approach may not
be suitable for Asia and the Americas. Its emphasis
lies on improving treatment of and diminishing ex-
posure to infection among infants and primigravi-
dae because the burden of severe disease lies in that
relatively small segment of the population. Rela-
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Fig. 5. Hypothetical relationship between risk of disease caused
by malaria and the incidence density of exposure to infection.
Where malaria is incidental, epidemic or hypoendemic (seg-
ment A), risk of disease generally equates with risk of exposure.
Where malaria is meso- to holoendemic (segment B), naturally
acquired immunity consolidates with increasing exposure.
Where malaria is hyper- to holoendemic disease rarely occurs
(segment C), except among the young, where transmission is
especially intense (segment D).
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tively expensive insecticide-treated bed net pro-
grammes, as well as chemoprophylactic or chemo-
therapeutic interventions, may be economically fo-
cused upon those most at risk. Given the intensity
of exposure in holoendemic Africa, the likelihood
of appreciably diminishing the number of people
infected may be considered remote by conven-
tional vector control means. In contrast, in endemic
areas outside holoendemic Africa, the entire popu-
lation is at relatively low risk of infection but high
risk of severe disease with infection. In this setting
reducing risk of severe disease through minimising
risk of exposure to infection per se, i.e. vector con-
trol, may be tenable. As sketched in this review,
vector control has a proven record of effectiveness
in a non-African setting. The economic and techni-
cal difficulties of accomplishing effective diagno-
sis and treatment in the rural tropics, given the tools
now at hand, should further encourage activities
directed against the vectors of malaria.
4.2 Diagnosis and Treatment
The utility of reliable diagnosis and treatment
varies with the risk of malaria among patients with
fever. Where the risk is high, most people treat them-
selves without the involvement of a medical pro-
fessional. Under these circumstances improved
diagnostic capability may have little effect on the
control of malaria. Even where adequately staffed
clinics are available, a presumptive clinical diag-
nosis of malaria is often the rule. This practice poses
no particular danger to patients actually infected
with plasmodia, but it exposes people with other
illnesses to unnecessary treatment and may delay
or preclude appropriate therapy.
Reliable malaria diagnostic capability requires
an investment in a trained microscopist, micro-
scope, staining supplies and reagents, and a commit-
ment to exercise quality assurance. Given the pre-
sumptive treatment of malaria in the absence of
diagnostic services where the risk of malaria among
febrile patients is high, it is difficult to see how
definitive diagnosis would substantially improve
the control of malaria (table II). On the other hand,
effective diagnosis where the risk of malaria among
febrile patients is low may be an effective instru-
ment of control. The minimal effort (assuming the
number of febrile patients would be low compared
with that in a highly endemic area) nets a relatively
large benefit with respect to control. Assuming the
availability of effective treatment, the effort would
systematically diminish the small number of dis-
ease carriers in the community and minimise trans-
mission. Moreover, diagnostic capability enables ac-
tive case detection and survey, i.e. identifying and
treating asymptomatic carriers. The clinical and
public health importance of a definitive diagnosis
of malaria is relatively high where the risk of ma-
laria and presumptive therapy for it among febrile
patients is low.Whether used in a clinical or survey
setting, the public health utility of a definitive di-
agnosis of malaria wilts without effective therapy.
Effective treatment for malaria is the exception
in the rural tropics. The encroachment of resistance
to chloroquine or pyrimethamine/sulfadoxine largely
explains this problem. The eroding efficacy of
Table II. Presumptive versus definitive diagnosis of malaria as an instrument of control
Malaria risk among febrile patients
low high
Febrile cases/unit time Few Many
Clinical diagnosis of malaria Infrequent Frequent
Usual misdiagnosis False negative False positive
Benefit of definitive diagnosis Appropriate treatment Avoid unnecessary treatment
Beneficiary Few with malaria Few without malaria
Cost/beneficiary High High
Effort/beneficiary Small Large
Control value of definitive diagnosis High Low
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these drugs has contributed substantially to the re-
surgence of malaria over the past 30 years. Although
new antimalarials have appeared in the marketplace
during this time, none has yet supplanted chloro-
quine. The characteristics of their cost, safety, tol-
erability and efficacy have not matched those of
chloroquine. The prohibitive cost of most new an-
timalarials precludes immediate clinical relevance
to the vast majority of people exposed to infection.
Although the expiry of patent protection of these
drugs may eventually see them more universally
available, drugs such asmefloquine or halofantrine
are less well tolerated than chloroquine.[77] There
are no drugs on the market at any cost or in ad-
vanced development that appear to be as well tol-
erated as chloroquine. Hope for such a product in
the foreseeable future appears dim.
Combining blood schizonticidal antimalarials
represents an important or even imperative mea-
sure to address the important problem of resistance
to available therapies. Combinations of existing an-
timalarials, especially those now available in rural
clinics and marketplaces, hold great potential for
effective, self-administered therapies for uncompli-
cated malaria. For example, combining chloroquine
or pyrimethamine/sulfadoxine with an artemisinin
derivative may rescue an otherwise ineffective
therapy while simultaneously guarding against the
emergence of resistance to artemisinin. This ap-
proach, as explained byWhite and others,[78,79] de-
serves vigorous investigation. Applying combined
therapies to the problem should demand a high stand-
ard of proof of safety and efficacy in randomised,
double-blind, placebo-controlled (i.e. monother-
apy + placebo) trials. Among the many challenges
to the use of combined therapies for malaria is de-
velopment of the research capability needed to
generate proven formulations and administration
regimens. Current work on the artemisinin deriva-
tives in combination with standard therapies such
as mefloquine[80-83] lays the foundation for clinical
research strategies for such endeavours in develop-
ing nations.
The availability of demonstrably well tolerated
and effective combined therapies constitutes the first
half of the journey to bringing the malaria problem
under control. Such products should move through
meaningful licensing in order to realise the full mea-
sure of impact against malaria. Licensing accom-
plishes essential guarantees of safety, efficacy and
good manufacture, thereby protecting the product
and the people receiving it. Licensing therapies re-
quires special expertise and a commitment to meet
challenging regulatory requirements.
Regulatory obstacles in the commercial devel-
opment of drugs in the developed nations add tre-
mendously to the cost of drugs in the free market-
place. Combined therapies using drugs that lack
patent protection, and the intrinsic difficulties in
having industry competitors share Investigational
New Drug licences, largely cripple the commercial
pharmaceutical industry in this arena. These indus-
tries should not be looked to for progress in devel-
oping and fielding combined antimalarial thera-
pies. Noncommercial organisations must seize the
initiative of developing licensed combinations of
antimalarials. Seeing development of antimalarials
through to distribution at costs that undercut the
demand for inappropriately used drugs may radi-
cally improve treatment of uncomplicated malaria
in remote areas of the tropics. The key is providing
access to inexpensive and well tolerated therapy
that can be administered with minimal medical su-
pervision, if any at all.
4.3 Vector Control
The industry that creates insecticides uses a de-
velopment paradigm that largely ignores applica-
tions against insect vectors of human disease. It is
highly commercial and driven by agricultural mar-
ket forces. Medically important insecticides such as
malathion and various pyrethroids have been inci-
dental products developed for agricultural applica-
tions. The licensing of insecticides for agricultural
use demands minimal effect on the environment,
i.e. rapid lethal activity and quick degradation.
Low toxicity to plants and short residual action
drive the design of agricultural pesticides, while
human toxicity and noxiousness apply largely to
degradation products. The active product may be
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both, provided its degradation yields safe and well
tolerated derivatives. Malathion typifies such prod-
ucts: it is mildly toxic and appreciably noxious to
human beings but it rapidly degrades to innocuous
products. These characteristics make it an ideal ag-
ricultural pesticide. The criteria that bring success-
ful agricultural pesticides to the marketplace are
not necessarily favourable for the control of medi-
cally important arthropods. The fact that DDT was
developed as amedical insecticide and then applied
agriculturally suggests that the converse may also
be true. Medical insecticides should be developed
independently of agricultural pesticides.
The properties of DDT, with the effective per-
formance evident in its extraordinary accomplish-
ments, should serve as the ‘gold standard’ for de-
velopment criteria. The ideal pesticide for the control
of vector-borne diseases would be stable in the in-
terior environment, unstable outdoors, have a low
capacity for bioaccumulation (e.g. partition poorly
into vertebrate tissue) and be powerfully repellent
to human blood meal-seeking insects. The safety
of such a pesticide to plants would be almost irrel-
evant, while mammalian toxicity and tolerance
would be critically important. Likewise, the dispo-
sition of the compound on surfaces in the home,
rather than on crops, would appropriately narrow
the search. This development equation differs rad-
ically from that for products for agricultural use.
Important insecticides for the control of malaria
should not be expected from the agricultural sector.
Thus, it may be essential to commit to the de novo
design and development of pesticides intended
specifically for the control of vector-borne dis-
eases.
The resurgence of malaria that now threatens pub-
lic health through the tropics into subtropical zones
demands immediate measures. New insecticides, if
the challenge to develop them were taken up, would
enter into long range plans for turning back malaria.
The development, licensing, manufacture and dis-
tribution of a new pesticide would take at least 5
years under the best of circumstances. In the mean-
time, consideration should be given to the use of
DDT itself. Although authoritative sources cite vec-
tor resistance to DDT as an important contributing
factor in the global resurgence ofmalaria,[29,33,34,65]
evidence supporting that contention is broadly
lacking. Likewise, the propensity for DDT to accu-
mulate in human and animal tissues is beyond
doubt, but there has been no unequivocal demon-
stration of serious adverse effects on human health.
Finally, the medical application of DDT has not
been shown to cause significant harm to the envi-
ronment. If DDT remains a well tolerated and ef-
fective means of preventing human morbidity and
mortality caused by malaria, policy makers should
offer compelling arguments for its exclusion from
the practice of control.
Proponents of the ban on DDT point to its pirat-
ing from intended medical uses into the agricul-
tural sector. This practice undoubtedly occurs, but
its effect must be minimal given the relatively small
quantities of DDT needed for medical versus agri-
cultural applications. Some farmersmay cheat with
pirated DDT, but short of the near total capture of
medical DDT for illicit agricultural use, the con-
tamination of the environment may be reasonably
forecast as minimal. Formulating ‘medical DDT’
with a herbicide or any other substance that farmers
find intolerable on crops would largely solve this
problem. The difficulty lies in securing the exper-
tise and political will to formulate, license and
manufacture medical DDT.
The rising tide of malaria may ultimately force
the application of residual pesticides. Meaningful
deliberation of the risks and benefits of DDT as a
tool to be applied againstmalaria should take place.
Also, a commitment to development of medical in-
secticides would represent an important step for-
ward in the long term. The social pressure for out-
lawing DDT may be irresponsible with regard to
protecting human health against diseases that kill
millions, but no less so than the failure of the com-
munity of science to develop socially and environ-
mentally acceptable pesticides specifically suited
for use against medically important arthropods. It
is a stunning realisation that we almost completely
lack such capability in the face of the vector-borne
diseases that threaten public health everywhere.
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5. Conclusions
The retreat of vector control as the primary in-
strument of limiting morbidity and mortality caused
by malaria outside holoendemic Africa is being
driven by loosely conceived concepts of its failure.
These are listed below.
• Vector control is unsustainable in developing
nations. This view largely ignores the extraor-
dinary achievements realised relatively quickly
and with little or no political and fiscal support
from anywhere in the developed world outside
the US. The sustainability of vector control with
a broader commitment to support it seems
likely. The maintenance of extremely low levels
of malaria on the islands of Java and Bali in
Indonesia for a period of over 30 years dem-
onstrates that committed developing nations
sustain such programmes and reap their bene-
fits.
• DDT harms human health and the environment.
There is no direct evidence to support this con-
cept, and much of the indirect evidence derives
from the impact of the agricultural application
of DDT. Despite the many millions of tons of
DDT applied liberally to crops for more than 20
years (a practice that ceased in the US almost 30
years ago), exposure to DDT in the environment
does not increase the risk of any human disease.
Thus, it seems likely that the medical applica-
tion of DDT in homes rather than dusted onto
crops represents a lesser risk to both human and
wildlife health. Claims of subtle health effects
of DDT pale in comparison to the unambiguous
and lethal threat of malaria.
• Vector resistance to DDT has rendered it inef-
fective. This concept appears repeatedly in the
medical literature without substantiation. Re-
ports of diminished susceptibility to the lethal
effects of DDT by anopheline mosquitoes may
not be relevant in the practice of malaria con-
trol. Excito-repellency apparently represents
the basis of preventing malaria, i.e. diminishing
vector contact with humans without killing
mosquitoes. Credible reviews of the available
evidence do not show resistance to influence
DDT effectiveness in controlling malaria.
• DDT is socially unacceptable. This concept is
largely true, but the tendency to leverage this
liability against vector control in general should
be resisted. The medical application of DDT is
socially unacceptable in the same manner that
most Americans find the metric system intoler-
able; the prevailing view is not necessarily cor-
rect, nor does it disqualify efforts to address it.
More importantly, misconceptions about DDT
do not relieve the community of science from
the duty to field a better product. Reliance upon
agricultural industry to develop and supply in-
secticides of medical importance is unaccept-
able.
• DDT spraying programmes do not work. This
concept captures elements of all of the above,
but also includes the failure to eradicate malaria
during the Global Eradication Campaign, or to
have an impact on malaria in holoendemic Af-
rica. Even strident advocates of DDT do not ar-
gue for a return to the eradication strategy, nor
would most recommend such an objective for
holoendemicAfrica. Nonetheless, the campaign
showed that control through spraying a stable
residual insecticide that repels mosquitoes
achieves control. In the face of an increasingly
volatile malaria situation in Asia and the Amer-
icas, this history bears recall.
The momentum to control malaria through clin-
ical management outside holoendemic Africa car-
ries important risks. Gauging these is difficult be-
cause the strategy represents venturing into largely
uncharted territory. Diagnosis and treatment has
not been the primary instrument of control across
vast endemic regions, except in Africa. The impor-
tant risks are summarised below.
• Malaria is poised to spiral out of control. A
global malaria crisis may not be the time to ex-
plore untried strategies of dealing with the prob-
lem.Theconsequencesof failuremaybe toogreat.
• Diagnostic performance is poor in most en-
demic areas. Although new dipstick technolo-
gies promise some day to improve the reliability
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of the diagnosis of malaria, today these tests are
relatively insensitive (sensitivity is uniformly
superior only above 100 parasites/μl). In endemic
areas where the author has worked, more than
three-quarters of parasitaemias fall below this
threshold. Expense of the dipstick assays is also
a problem. Even at the cut-rate cost of $US1.00
per test, this is too expensive for most people
exposed to malaria. Today, in the face of crisis,
diagnostic capabilities in many endemic areas
are either poor or nonexistent. Reliance upon
diagnosis as a foundation of control is risky un-
der these circumstances.
• Treatment is inadequate in most endemic areas.
The benefit of prompt and reliable diagnosis van-
ishes with inadequate treatment. Chloroquine
and pyrimethamine/sulfadoxine overwhelm-
ingly dominate the antimalarial pharmacies of
healthcare providers and merchants in the im-
poverished rural tropics. These drugs fail to
achieve cure more often than not. Promising
new therapies and therapeutic strategies are on
the horizon, but none is broadly fielded where
the malaria crisis looms. Reliance upon treat-
ment as a foundation of control is risky under
these circumstances.
• Asians and Americans exposed to malaria are
not immune. Compared with the risk to Africans
living in holoendemic areas (except possibly in-
fants, small children and pregnant women) the
risk of severe disease and death with infection
in any Asian or American is very much higher.
Thus, an infection in Sumatra carries a much
higher probability of morbidity or mortality
than one in Burkina Faso. Acontrol strategy that
does not intervene until clinical illness mani-
fests in the patient from Sumatra seems unnec-
essarily risky. Moreover, the reluctance to abate
risk of exposure for fear of diminishing naturally
acquired immunity is irrelevant in Sumatra.
Turning back resurgent malaria requires ac-
knowledgement that the problem lies predomi-
nantly outside holoendemic Africa. The severe and
worsening malaria situation in most of that region
revolves around evidence of deteriorating efficacy
of chemotherapeutic agents. Malaria in holoende-
micAfrica remains stable but appears to be increas-
ingly difficult to manage in the clinic or through
appropriate treatment at home. The best route to
addressing this problem has been set forth by the
WHO 1993 policy on control strategies. In contrast,
the worsening malaria situation in Asia and the
Americas revolves around an alarming increase in
the number and geographic range of reported infec-
tions. The two most important factors contributing
to this resurgence may be clinical resistance to avail-
able chemotherapeutic agents, and a general degra-
dation in the will and ability to conduct sustainable
vector control activities. The latter problem may
worsen with applying an African solution to an
American and Asian problem. Separating policies
for holoendemic Africa from those suitable in the
Americas and Asia may help solve both problems.
A focused policy with greatly intensified effort to
reduce childhoodmorbidity andmortality in Africa
has been accomplished under the leadership of the
WHO. However, the resurgence in numbers of ma-
laria cases and the encroachment of the disease into
areas where it had been virtually eradicated outside
holoendemic Africa may continue unabated with-
out a parallel policy focused on that unique prob-
lem.
The best available evidence suggests that vector
control programmes applying DDT or other resid-
ual insecticides offer the best hope for turning back
resurgent malaria in Asia and the Americas. If the
use of DDT is socially impractical, an effort should
be made to develop more suitable medical pesti-
cides through a rational process driven by medical
rather than agricultural entomology needs. The cri-
teria that drive the development of agricultural pes-
ticides conflict with those needed for the creation
ofmedically important products. The historical and
continuing reliance upon the agricultural pesticide
industry for medical applications offers no bright
prospects. The lack of will to attack this problem
by seizing themedical insecticide development ini-
tiative from agricultural interests may be the great-
est impediment to achieving great strides against
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resurgent malaria and, incidentally or intention-
ally, other vector-borne disease as well.
A well tolerated and affordable treatment for
malaria with a high likelihood of compliance is
equally important to bringing resurgent malaria
under control. The heart of the problem has impor-
tant parallels with the insecticides. Reliance on the
pharmaceutical industry to provide such antimalar-
ials is unrealistic. Even the US Department of De-
fense, which produced chloroquine and prima-
quine, rationally turns over hugely expensive
development costs to pharmaceutical partners that
subsequently market relatively expensive prod-
ucts, e.g. mefloquine or halofantrine. The initiative
to develop well tolerated and affordable antimalar-
ials should be seized by the governments of nations
struggling with malaria and the international agen-
cies that support their efforts in public health.
Combining available antimalarials and evaluating
these in rigorous clinical trials may be the best ap-
proach to accomplishing a useful product in the
shortest time.
Malaria affects the poor. Solutions that poor peo-
ple can afford and independently manage at the vil-
lage level offer the brightest hope. This may be one
of the few characteristics that solutions for Africa,
the Americas and Asia share. Otherwise, these re-
gions face fundamentally distinct problems. The
poor rely upon the community of science for guid-
ance on relieving themselves from the onerous bur-
den of malaria. The challenge for national govern-
ments and international agencies is to offer guidance
that proves practical across a spectrum of environ-
mental, social and economic conditions.Current con-
ditions in the rural tropics such as poor diagnosis,
inadequate treatment, and an enfeebled vector con-
trol infrastructure underpin the forecast of an in-
creasingly serious problem. Averting the onslaught
of malaria thus expected in the first decade of the
new millennium defines a monumental challenge.
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